Chiara Caterina Gatti
Student in the MSc in Terrorism, Policing and Security at Liverpool John Moores University
Associate, Policyinstitute.net

In recent years, prison radicalization has become an increasingly central issue among the national security challenges faced by many countries, particularly in Europe. It is not a problem confined to prisons, but a growing threat to collective security. Radicalized individuals can indoctrinate other inmates and organize extremist activities within penitentiary facilities, exploiting isolation, vulnerability, and social networks in prison to pursue their extremist “struggle.”​

A striking example is Michael Chiolo, an inmate at the high-security prison of Alençon-Condé-sur-Sarthe, who on March 5, 2019, seriously injured two prison officers. Chiolo later justified his actions as an act of support for Chérif Chekatt, the perpetrator of the jihadist attack in Strasbourg on December 11, 2018. Radicalized in prison and known to have been in contact with Chekatt, Chiolo demonstrates how prisons can become centers of propaganda, recruitment, and operational planning for terrorist actions.

Factors Favoring Prison Radicalization

Penitentiaries represent a particularly fertile ground for radicalization. Inmates, often frustrated, psychologically vulnerable, and socially marginalized, are more susceptible to adopting extremist ideologies. Within prisons, they seek a sense of identity and belonging, protection, and recognition. They also often look for purpose and a role in prison life—conditions that radical groups exploit for recruitment and indoctrination.

A crucial factor in prison radicalization is the organizational structure of penitentiary institutions and the lack of personnel and financial resources. Overcrowding creates environments in which inmates live in precarious and poorly controlled conditions. This favors the formation of internal hierarchies, later exploited by already radicalized inmates to influence and recruit others. The scarcity of staff and financial resources severely limits effective monitoring: it becomes difficult to control inmates and quell internal conflicts. Moreover, the lack of reintegration programs pushes inmates toward extremist ideologies, leaving them with few alternatives.

Mechanisms of Prison Radicalization​

One of the main mechanisms of radicalization in prisons is proselytism: already radicalized individuals attempt to convince other inmates to join their “extremist struggle,” exploiting their psychological and identity vulnerabilities. Additionally, the creation of protection and support networks strengthens the bond between radicalizers and future recruits, generating a sort of “vassalage” within the prison, where material and moral support consolidates loyalty and ideological influence. This process is facilitated by the formation of closed networks, small isolated groups that provide identity and protection, making authorities’ interventions more difficult.

Religious activities can also be instrumentalized: moments of worship and prayer are turned into channels for legitimizing extremist ideologies, facilitating propaganda and recruitment. These dynamics are further reinforced by maintaining contacts with the outside, which radicalized inmates use to receive instructions, spread messages, and maintain operational links with terrorist networks.

Institutional Responses and Prevention Strategies: The Italian Example

Although Italy does not experience high levels of prison radicalization like France or the United Kingdom, its institutional responses and prevention strategies are noteworthy. Among the main measures is the establishment of the high-security sub-circuit (AS2) for inmates charged with or convicted of terrorism or violent subversion. Its purpose is to reduce the risk of proselytism and potential contacts between radicalized inmates and the general population. Within AS2, inmates are separated according to the type of terrorism they are affiliated with, distinguishing between Islamic and national organizations (Red Brigades or anarchist groups).

Regarding religious prevention, the practice of Islam is supported in accordance with Article 26 of the Penitentiary Code. Qualified imams and cultural mediators are integrated into prisons to counter internal radicalization and prevent the emergence of “vassalage” among inmates.​

Another key aspect is staff training and internal monitoring. Prison personnel undergo courses and training modules on radicalization and religious and ideological proselytism, while the Central Investigative Unit (NIC) and regional investigative units (NIR) monitor inmates, collecting information and conducting risk assessments.

Prevention also extends beyond prisons: in 2024, the NIC expelled 22 individuals released at the end of their sentence because they were considered at high risk of violent radicalization. The NIC also collaborates with the Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA), participating in assessments of inmates approaching release, evaluating possible expulsion or reintegration processes.

Regarding the reintegration of former radicalized inmates, Italy implements the Reintegration and Recovery Program (PRIR). This program combines educational and vocational training, psychological support, and the promotion of intercultural dialogue. Its goal is to reduce the vulnerability of inmates that extremist groups exploit for recruitment. Unlike the securitarian models adopted in other European countries, PRIR follows a personalized approach. Based on the inmate’s background, vulnerabilities, and risk of radicalization, tailored plans are designed to facilitate social reintegration and reduce the risk of recidivism.

Final considerations

Prison radicalization is not only an internal problem for the institutions themselves, but also a concern for national and European security: a concrete threat that cannot be underestimated. Addressing it requires multi-level strategies integrating prevention, monitoring, and social reintegration. In this regard, Italy demonstrates that it is possible to reduce the risk of extremist dissemination. Thanks to security measures, staff training, and targeted programs like PRIR, detention can serve as an effective counterterrorism tool, while also offering an opportunity for reintegration and strengthening social resilience.

Reading list

European Prison Observatory. 2019. Prison de-radicalization strategies, programmes and risk assessment tools in Europe. https://www.prisonobservatory.org/index.php?itemid=140&id=31&option=com_content&view=article

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2023. Chapter 8: Prevention of
Radicalization to Terrorism in Prisons. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Chapter-8-Handbook_1.pdf

Ministero della Giustizia. 2025. Relazione sull’amministrazione della giustizia – Anno
2024. https://www.giustizia.it/cmsresources/cms/documents/anno_giudiziario2025_relazione_amministrazione2024.pdf

Ronco, Daniela, Alvise Sbraccia e Giovanni Torrente. 2019. Prison de-radicalization strategies, programmes and risk assessment tools in Europe. European Prison Observatory.
https://iris.unito.it/bitstream/2318/1720819/1/Prison%20de-radicalization%20strategies.pdf

Note:
The views expressed in this article is solely that of the author’s and does not represent that of Policyinstitute.net and its entire staff.