Chiara Caterina Gatti
Student in the MSc in Terrorism, Policing and Security at Liverpool John Moores University
Associate, Policyinstitute.net
Over the past decades, especially with the advent of the War on Terror, the debate on managing non-state armed threats has focused on the concepts of Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN). Despite the significant theoretical differences between CT and COIN, they are, in practice, confused or applied in inappropriate contexts, more often than not. Analyzing this as an improper application is not only relevant at the military level. In contexts where jihadism, insurgencies, and state crises intersect within the same scenario, they can fall short of expectations, while unwarranted results might even transform into drivers of instability.
CT refers to the set of tools and operations aimed at neutralizing terrorist threats through targeted actions, such as the elimination of leadership and operational capabilities. These actions are typically selective and often time-limited, relying heavily on intelligence (Byman, 2006; Cronin, 2009). COIN, by contrast, is a broad and prolonged strategy aimed at isolating and neutralizing entrenched territorial insurgencies, combining military, political, and civilian tools to build state legitimacy and protect civilian populations (Galula, 1964; U.S. Army/Marine Corps, 2007). As these general definitions indicate, the two approaches stem from fundamentally different strategic paradigms. Consequently, before proceeding to action, it is essential to analyze and understand context, such as the nature of the threat, the structure of armed groups, and their relationship with the civilian population. When assumptions of CT and COIN are misinterpreted or merged, or when sound presuppositions of either one are ignored, the goals of specific operations are destined to produce failures.
In hybrid conflict settings, the effectiveness of a strategy depends less on the sophistication of the tools employed. It depends even more on the alignment between its strategic logic and operational reality. When this alignment is absent, the differences between approaches – despite their divergent underlying assumptions and objectives – tend to converge: operations lose effectiveness and give rise to counterproductive dynamics that undermine medium- to long-term sustainability.
Misconceptions and Standardization Within COIN
A common thread in the failures of CT and COIN strategies is the underestimation of scenario complexity and the application of standardized models to conflicts. In operational terms, misconception occurs when strategies assume threat characteristics that do not, or do not fully, correspond to the actual scenario. For example, it is assumed that all armed groups have the same stable hierarchical structure, defined territorial objectives, and links with the population; that intelligence capabilities are always sufficient and reliable; or that communities will positively accept the presence of foreign forces over a prolonged period. Based on erroneous assumptions, operations are planned that are coherent on paper but, when implemented, not only produce some amount of failure but may have counterproductive effects.
The assumption of misconceived ‘templates’ and their application to conflicts of a completely different nature has led to strategic miscalculations in the past. For instance, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, strategies initially developed for insurgent scenarios were applied to decentralized and transnational threats. The consequences were disastrous: alienation of local populations and strengthening of armed groups’ narratives increased levels of radicalization; community fragmentation grew, enhancing the organizational capacity and resilience of armed groups (Byman, 2006; Cronin, 2009; Kilcullen, 2010).
Conflict standardization is often a direct consequence of operational misconception. When strategies misinterpret the characteristics of the threat and local communities, the temptation arises to apply rigid, generic strategic models without accounting for scenario-specific factors. Ignoring political, social, cultural, and economic differences, as well as religious beliefs and historical backgrounds, this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach drastically reduces operational adaptability and prevents the capture of local dynamics essential for strategic success (Sherman, 2010). Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate in an exeplatory manner the consequences of applying a one-size-fits-all approach, including inefficient use of resources, increased violence of local communities, and the delegitimization of state forces (Jones, 2012; Mistry, 2019; Hoffman, 2017).
Multipliers of Instability and Conflict Accelerators
Beyond undermining operational and strategic effectiveness, misconceptions and standardization in the application of COIN act as genuine multipliers of instability, jeopardizing primary objectives of peace, security, and threat neutralization. These not only amount to tactical or strategic failures. They amplify pre-existing destabilizing dynamics, generating spill-over effects that can extend beyond local borders and influence already fragile regional and even transnational contexts. Moreover, they can operate as both multipliers and accelerators of conflict, increasing complexity, prolonging conflict duration, and structurally complicating the achievement of lasting success in strategic orientation.
Reading List
Byman, Daniel. 2006. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge University Press
Byman, Daniel. 2011. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press
Cronin, Audrey K. 2009. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton University Press
Galula, David. 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger. Kilcullen, David. 2010. Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. 2007. Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5). U.S. Department of the Army / U.S. Marine Corps
Sherman, John. 2010. One-Size-Fits-All Counterinsurgency: Limitations and Lessons
Jones, Seth G. 2012. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. W.W. Norton & Company
Mistry, Dhiren. 2019. One Size Fits None: Standardization and Its Limits in Counterinsurgency Operations
Hoffman, Bruce. 2017. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press.
Note:
The views expressed in this article is solely that of the author’s and does not represent that of Policyinstitute.net and its entire staff.
